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From the movie, Inside Job, one gets the sense that economists are ethically challenged 
because they take payments for writing papers that say what the funders of their research want 
them to say. The sense conveyed by the movie is that economists are for sale. In my view, that is 
far from the case; economists are not for-hire any more than a similar group of academic experts, 
and probably significantly less than many, since, by academic standards, economists tend to be 
well paid. The money given to economists by groups that support the policy positions they are 
espousing, either in the form of honoraria for a talk, payment as a director or consultant to the 
company, or funding for research, is seldom the reason economists are supporting their policy 
positions. The causal link generally goes the other way around. Thus, while I support reasonable, 
minimally invasive measures that increase transparency of funding, I see such measures as 
having little effect on the ethical failings of the economics profession. Economists will espouse 
the positions they espouse whether or not the funding takes place. If academic economists were 
primarily interested in the money, they could earn significantly more income by leaving 
academia and entering into business or finance. Money, or biased support of research, in my 
view, is not the most serious ethical issue facing the economics profession. The ethical problem 
of economists is deeper.  
The more serious ethical problem of economics has little to do with the funding of 
economic research on either the right or the left. It has to do with lack of humility. By this I mean 
that we economists have a tendency to convey more scientific certainty in our policy positions 
than the theory and evidence objectively would allow. Too many economists are willing to make 
seemingly definitive scientific statements about policy based on models, that they know, or 
should know, are highly imperfect. It was that tendency that I (Colander et al, 2009) criticized 
the profession for in the recent crisis. Back in 1927, Lionel Robbins (Robbins, 1927) argued that 
“what precision economists can claim at this stage is largely a sham precision. In the present 
state of knowledge, the man who can claim for economic science much exactitude is a quack.” 
Despite the advances economic science has made, that remains true today. Yet, all too often 
economists allow lay people and policy makers to believe that our policy suggestions have far 
more scientific foundation than a neutral objective observer would give them.  
Good economists recognize our tendency to do this, but too often allow other individuals 
and other economists to convey their findings and policy views in ways that make those views 
seem far more scientifically grounded than they are. This tendency is exacerbated by an ethical 
failing in the reporting profession, which, when looking for a good story, will gravitate to 
economists who most overstate the conclusions of policy. A newspaper article concluding with 
“This finding is at best suggestive, and goes far beyond what one can say with scientific 
certainty.” does not endear a reporter to his editor. Thus, not only are economists as a group not 
humble enough, what lay people are presented as economist’s policy recommendations are often 
the policy recommendations of the least humble economist. In summary, my argument is that 
lack of humility in conveying the limitations of their results is the most serious ethical problem 
facing economists; it played a much larger role in causing the recent financial crisis than did the 
type of payments highlighted by Inside Job. Thus, and any new code of ethics for economists 
should deal with that humility problem.  2 
Applied Science vs. Engineering 
How does one go about creating humble economist? I don’t have a complete answer to 
that, but one step toward doing so would involve a change in the self-image of applied 
economists. Currently applied economists see themselves as applied scientists. My argument in 
this paper is that that needs to change. Applied economists should see themselves as engineers, 
not as applied scientists, as Howard Wolowitz’s, rather than Sheldon Cooper’s or even Leonard 
Hofstadter’s. That change in self image would be an important step toward creating a more 
humble economics profession, and would bring about major changes in their method, which 
would contribute toward creating a more ethical economics profession. 
To many economists I suspect that my argument that most economists should see 
themselves as engineers, not applied scientists will seem strange. Isn’t engineering just applied 
science? My answer is no, it isn’t; if anything science is applied engineering. Engineering and 
applied science can be distinguished by their primary goals and methods.  
The primary goal of science is finding the truth--understanding for the sake of 
understanding. Science is about finding the truth. Its methods are consistent with that goal, and 
those methods have evolved into relatively formal prescriptions about methods that guide and 
limit scientists in their work. Back of the envelop calculations, value judgments, guestimates, 
heuristic models, rough generalizations from case studies, common sense observation, and fudge 
factors are not the methods to establish scientific truths. The scientific method requires rigorous 
analysis, and precise conventions to counter individual's tendency toward fast pattern 
completion. A set of conventions about how to do empirical analysis, how to develop models, the 
appropriate level of statistical significance of empirical work such as appropriate t values, the 
appropriate structure of experiments such as randomized, double blind, placebo controlled 
experiments, become part of its method.  
Doing good science is costly and time consuming, but the amount of time or effort it 
takes to resolve an issue is not a considered a legitimate consideration in establishing a scientific 
result. A scientific truth is timeless, and if your goal is true understanding, then anything less 
than the methodological gold standard is not good enough to establish the truth. Applied science 
involves the translation of scientific findings to solve real world problems and, in principle, it 
holds itself up to the same standards as does science since the primary goal is scientific 
understanding. Applied science has science and the scientific method at its core.  
Engineering is different than science. The primary goal of engineers is solving a specific 
problem with available resources, and an engineering solution can only be judged relative to its 
cost. Whereas the scientific method does not allow shortcuts to save time and money, the 
engineering method does. Engineering is by nature applied, and it has no scientific core, or 
general formal methodological prescriptions based on the scientific methods. Billy Vaughn 
Koen, (2003) who has written what appears to be the current standard methodological treatise for 
engineering defines the engineering method as “The strategy for causing the best change in a 
poorly understood or uncertain situation within the available resources.” He describes an 
engineer as an individual who solves problems using engineering heuristics. He argues that an 3 
engineer makes no pretence of having found the truth, or having found the “correct” model.
1 An 
engineer focuses on finding solutions that work, and uses whatever methods he finds best leads 
to finding a solution to the particular problem he is trying to solve. In the engineering field, there 
are no rigid prescriptions guiding method. 
Engineering uses science when appropriate, but where science does not have an answer to 
a part of the question that is needed to come to a policy recommendation, an engineer finds the 
best answer it can, and uses that. An engineering method might involve back of the envelop 
calculations, input from other specialties, guestimates, and individual judgment—whatever is 
needed to provide the best answer an engineer can provide to the problem he or she is trying to 
solve. In providing an engineer’s recommendation, an engineer follows the weakest link 
principle—and presents his or her recommendation with no more certainty than he has in the 
weakest link of the analysis needed to arrive at a solution.  
This difference in focus between applied science and engineering means that the 
engineering method can differ significantly from the applied science method. If a rule of thumb 
seems to work in similar cases, it will be incorporated even though it has no scientific 
foundation. If arriving at a policy recommendation involves making value judgments, the 
engineering method makes what it believes are reasonable value judgments. There is no need to 
shy away from them. If the data don’t exist that meet appropriate levels of statistical 
significance, or if it doesn’t seem cost effective to collect and analyze the data to that level of 
precision, the engineer uses the best data he or she can to arrive at the cost he or she believes 
appropriate.  
I am not arguing that engineering uses an “anything goes” methodology. Acceptable 
heuristics, which is what engineers call methodology, develop endogenously within the 
engineering profession about what approaches are acceptable and which aren’t. These state of the 
art methods change over time (which is why “state of the art” is an important concept in any 
engineering methodology) and are developed by the engineering specialists in a particular field. 
Acceptable heuristics can differ in different branches of engineering, and there is no overarching 
methodogical requirement, other than “what seems to work.” 
I am fully aware of the ambiguity of the term science, and I agree that, in principle, it 
makes no difference whether someone calls him or herself an applied scientist or an engineer —
it is just a name. But, as I hope I have made clear above, the method that an applied researcher 
uses matters a lot, both in how an applied researchers goes about his or her research and in how 
he or she presents research findings. To the degree that self-classification affects method, it 
makes a big difference.  
My argument is that most economists (and most applied natural scientists as well) are 
actually engineers, who, in practice often go about their research (and should go about their 
research) using an engineering method. The problem I see is that they don’t use it enough, and 
they don’t make it clear to others that they are using an engineering method, not a scientific 
method. Their self-classification as applied scientists leads them to contort their methodological 
                                                   
1 Koen argues that the engineering method, which he calls a universal method, predates the scientific method, and 
that scientific method is simply an application of the engineering method when the research goal is finding the truth, 
rather than to solve a particular problem. 4 
approach to attempt to make it seem to fit a scientific method, and to present their research 
findings and conclusions as scientific truths, not as rough and ready engineering insights that can 
be useful in looking at particular problems. Seeing oneself as a scientist undermines the humility 
the actual practice of applied economics warrants.  
Presenting findings as scientific findings give those findings an aura of validity that goes 
beyond the method used. An example of what I mean can be seen in econometric findings, which 
are often are presented as having met scientific standards, when in fact, the findings are often 
rough and ready engineering guestimates based on reasonable proxies. Since even the reasonable 
proxies are often highly imperfect, the empirical results should be seen as highly questionable 
regardless of the statistical precision of the analysis. To present results as meeting a 95% 
confidence interval can lead nonspecialists to have more confidence in the results than is 
warranted. Economists data mine, and choose models based on analytic tractability, not 
appropriateness to the process. That all makes sense, but to present results of work that uses 
these reasonable ad hoc engineering methods as scientific results, and not as engineering results, 
does not.  
My argument is that most applied economics involves many of the same pragmatic 
methods as does engineering. But we economists tend to be less open about our actual methods 
because they seem to violate scientific methodology. We see applied economics as applied 
science, which places scientific models and scientific facts at the center of our analysis. For 
example, we justify a DSGE modeling strategy because it is more “scientific” than other 
modeling strategies ever though it is forcing our macro models into a form that intuitively 
doesn’t fit the macro reality. With sufficient gyrations, DSGE models can be made to fit, but 
from an engineering standpoint it is unclear what one has gained from the analytic contortions 
necessary to do so, and the loss of not using models which can better capture the likely problems 
faced by a macroeconomy. Similarly, with standard macro models.  
An engineer’s approach to modeling such a complex system as the macro economy 
would likely focus much more on statistical models and methods of pulling patterns out of the 
data. It would explore a wide variety of formal models to gain analytic insight, and then would 
integrate the many variety of models with the statistical models to interpret the patterns. That 
would involve a fundamentally different way of doing macro and of thinking about macro 
problems. Similarly, with micro. Economists focus much of their applied micro policy discussion 
on Pareto optimal solutions even though we know that all actual policies will violate Pareto 
optimality. We can contort our micro policy models designed to provide Pareto optimal solutions 
to provide insight into non-Pareto optimal solutions, but, generally, that contortion comes at a 
cost. It means that we spend less time discussing other models that betting fit not Pareto optimal 
solutions, but “reasonable person solutions” that more closely reflect society’s value judgments. 
An engineering applied microeconomics would likely have an entire branch devoted to 
measuring society’s value judgments and integrating those judgments into applied policy 
instruments. Our scientific applied micro leaves the topic almost totally undiscussed.  
My interest in this paper is not in how economist’s research methods and applied 
economics would change if economists saw themselves as engineers; it is in how economists 
view of themselves and presentations of their findings would change if they saw themselves as 
engineers. My argument is that the economists as engineer would be much more humble in their 
presentation of results than the economists as applied scientist. Because the engineering method 5 
is by nature pragmatic and unjustified, and makes no claim to being the truth, an engineer would 
tend to be more modest about his work. Accepting that economists are engineers, not applied 
scientists, would take economic policy out of the realm of science, and put it in the realm of 
engineering or art, where uncertainty reigns, and where the need for judgments is explicitly 
acknowledged. Debates in economic policy would move outside of economics, and the role that 
economic models would play would change.  
Applied economists as engineers would not claim scientific status for our policy 
pronouncements, and heuristics would develop to compare various policy pronouncements of 
different economists. Those heuristics would recognize that the judgments underlying policy 
pronouncements are subject to legitimate debate, and that debate about nuance would tend to 
make our make our policy pronouncements more humble.  
A Code of Ethics for Economists 
  My goal in this paper is not to make the argument for economists seeing themselves as 
engineers; I have dealt with that in another paper. (Colander, 2011) My goal in this paper is to 
explain how seeing ourselves as engineers, not applied scientists, would help us arrive at a code 
of ethics for economists. My hypothesis is the following: If it is true that economics is essentially 
engineering, then a code of ethics for engineers should nicely translate into a code of ethics for 
economists. I believe it does so. To demonstrate that, I went to the National Society of 
Professional Engineers and found their code of ethics. 
(http://www.jenmdse.net/MSE/pd/NSPECodeofEthics.pdf). I then did a global change of the 
word” engineer” to “economist”, and arrived at the following code, which I believe would make 
a good first stab at a code of ethics for the economics profession.  
Code of Ethics for Economists (Adopted from the Code of Ethics for Engineers) 
Preamble  
Economics is an important and learned profession. As members of this profession, economists 
are expected to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Economics has a direct and 
vital  impact  on  the  quality  of  life  for  all  people.  Accordingly,  the  services  provided  by 
economists  require  honesty,  impartiality,  fairness,  and  equity,  and  must  be  dedicated  to  the 
protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. Economists must perform under a standard of 
professional behavior that requires adherence to the highest principles of ethical conduct.  
I. Fundamental Canons  
Economists, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall:  
1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.  
2. Perform services only in areas of their competence.  
3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.  
4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.  6 
5. Avoid deceptive acts.  
6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance the 
honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession.  
 
II. Rules of Practice  
1. Economists shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.  
a. If economists’ judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life or property, 
they shall notify their employer or client and such other authority as may be appropriate.  
b. Economists shall approve only those economics documents that are in conformity with 
applicable standards.  
c. Economists shall not reveal facts, data, or information without the prior consent of the 
client or employer except as authorized or required by law or this Code.  
d. Economists shall not permit the use of their name or associate in business ventures with any 
person or firm that they believe is engaged in fraudulent or dishonest enterprise.  
e. Economists shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of economics by a person or firm.  
f. Economists having knowledge of any alleged violation of this Code shall report thereon to 
appropriate professional bodies and, when relevant, also to public authorities, and 
cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be 
required.  
 
2. Economists shall perform services only in the areas of their competence.  
a. Economists shall undertake assignments only when qualified by education or experience in the 
specific technical fields involved.  
b. Economists shall not affix their signatures to any plans or documents dealing with subject 
matter in which they lack competence, nor to any plan or document not prepared under their 
direction and control.  
c. Economists may accept assignments and assume responsibility for coordination of an entire 
project and sign and seal the economics documents for the entire project, provided that each 
technical segment is signed and sealed only by the qualified Economists who prepared the 
segment.  
 
3. Economists shall issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.  
a. Economists shall be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony. 7 
They shall include all relevant and pertinent information in such reports, statements, or 
testimony, which should bear the date indicating when it was current.  
b. Economists may express publicly technical opinions that are founded upon knowledge of the 
facts and competence in the subject matter.  
c. Economists shall issue no statements, criticisms, or arguments on technical matters that are 
inspired or paid for by interested parties, unless they have prefaced their comments by 
explicitly identifying the interested parties on whose behalf they are speaking, and by 
revealing the existence of any interest the economists may have in the matters.  
 
4. Economists shall act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.  
a. Economists shall disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest that could influence or 
appear to influence their judgment or the quality of their services.  
b. Economists shall not accept compensation, financial or otherwise, from more than one party 
for services on the same project, or for services pertaining to the same project, unless the 
circumstances are fully disclosed and agreed to by all interested parties.  
c. Economists shall not solicit or accept financial or other valuable consideration, directly or 
indirectly, from outside agents in connection with the work for which they are responsible.  
d. Economists in public service as members, advisors, or employees of a governmental or quasi-
governmental body or department shall not participate in decisions with respect to services 
solicited or provided by them or their organizations in private or public economics practice.  
e. Economists shall not solicit or accept a contract from a governmental body on which a 
principal or officer of their organization serves as a member.  
 
5. Economists shall avoid deceptive acts.  
a. Economists shall not falsify their qualifications or permit misrepresentation of their or their 
associates’ qualifications. They shall not misrepresent or exaggerate their responsibility in or 
for the subject matter of prior assignments. Brochures or other presentations incident to the 
solicitation of employment shall not misrepresent pertinent facts concerning employers, 
employees, associates, joint venturers, or past accomplishments.  
b. Economists shall not offer, give, solicit, or receive, either directly or indirectly, any 
contribution to influence the award of a contract by public authority, or which may be 
reasonably construed by the public as having the effect or intent of influencing the awarding 
of a contract. They shall not offer any gift or other valuable consideration in order to secure 
work. They shall not pay a commission, percentage, or brokerage fee in order to secure work, 
except to a bona fide employee or bona fide established commercial or marketing agencies 
retained by them.  8 
 
III. Professional Obligations  
1. Economists shall be guided in all their relations by the highest standards of honesty and 
integrity.  
a. Economists shall acknowledge their errors and shall not distort or alter the facts.  
b. Economists shall advise their clients or employers when they believe a project will not be 
successful.  
c. Economists shall not accept outside employment to the detriment of their regular work or 
interest. Before accepting any outside economics employment, they will notify their 
employers.  
d. Economists shall not attempt to attract an economist from another employer by false or 
misleading pretenses.  
e. Economists shall not promote their own interest at the expense of the dignity and integrity of 
the profession.  
 
2. Economists shall at all times strive to serve the public interest.  
a. Economists are encouraged to participate in civic affairs; career guidance for youths; and work 
for the advancement of the safety, health, and well-being of their community.  
b. Economists shall not complete, sign, or seal plans and/or specifications that are not in 
conformity with applicable economics standards. If the client or employer insists on such 
unprofessional conduct, they shall notify the proper authorities and withdraw from further 
service on the project.  
c. Economists are encouraged to extend public knowledge and appreciation of economics and its 
achievements.  
d. Economists are encouraged to adhere to the principles of sustainable development
 
in order to 
protect the environment for future generations.  
3. Economists shall avoid all conduct or practice that deceives the public.  
a. Economists shall avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or 
omitting a material fact.  
b. Consistent with the foregoing, economists may advertise for recruitment of personnel.  
c. Consistent with the foregoing, economists may prepare articles for the lay or technical press, 
but such articles shall not imply credit to the author for work performed by others.  
 9 
4. Economists shall not disclose, without consent, confidential information concerning the 
business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client or employer, or 
public body on which they serve.  
a. Economists shall not, without the consent of all interested parties, promote or arrange for new 
employment or practice in connection with a specific project for which the economist has 
gained particular and specialized knowledge.  
b. Economists shall not, without the consent of all interested parties, participate in or represent an 
adversary interest in connection with a specific project or proceeding in which the economist 
has gained particular specialized knowledge on behalf of a former client or employer.  
 
5. Economists shall not be influenced in their professional duties by conflicting interests.  
a. Economists shall not accept financial or other considerations, including free economic designs, 
from material or equipment suppliers for specifying their product.  
b. Economists shall not accept commissions or allowances, directly or indirectly, from 
contractors or other parties dealing with clients or employers of the economist in connection 
with work for which the economist is responsible.  
 
6.  Economists  shall  not  attempt  to  obtain  employment  or  advancement  or  professional 
engagements  by  untruthfully  criticizing  other  economists,  or  by  other  improper  or 
questionable methods.  
a. Economists shall not request, propose, or accept a commission on a contingent basis under 
circumstances in which their judgment may be compromised.  
b. Economists in salaried positions shall accept part-time economics work only to the extent 
consistent with policies of the employer and in accordance with ethical considerations.  
c. Economists shall not, without consent, use equipment, supplies, laboratory, or office facilities 
of an employer to carry on outside private practice.  
 
7. Economists shall not attempt to injure, maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the 
professional  reputation,  prospects,  practice,  or  employment  of  other  economists. 
Economists  who believe others are guilty of unethical or illegal practice shall present 
such information to the proper authority for action.  
a. Economists in private practice shall not review the work of another economist for the same 
client, except with the knowledge of such economist, or unless the connection of such 
economist with the work has been terminated.  
b. Economists in governmental, industrial, or educational employ are entitled to review and 
evaluate the work of other economists when so required by their employment duties.  10 
c. Economists in sales or industrial employ are entitled to make economics comparisons of 
represented products with products of other suppliers.  
 
8. Economists shall accept personal responsibility for their professional activities, provided, 
however,  that  Economists  may  seek  indemnification  for  services  arising  out  of  their 
practice  for  other  than  gross  negligence,  where  the  economist’s  interests  cannot 
otherwise be protected.  
a. Economists shall conform with state registration laws in the practice of economics.  
b. Economists shall not use association with a noneconomist, a corporation, or partnership as a 
“cloak” for unethical acts.  
 
9. Economists shall give credit for economics work to those to whom credit is due, and will 
recognize the proprietary interests of others.  
a. Economists shall, whenever possible, name the person or persons who may be individually 
responsible for designs, inventions, writings, or other accomplishments.  
b. Economists using designs supplied by a client recognize that the designs remain the property 
of the client and may not be duplicated by the economist for others without express 
permission.  
c. Economists, before undertaking work for others in connection with which the economist may 
make improvements, plans, designs, inventions, or other records that may justify copyrights or 
patents, should enter into a positive agreement regarding ownership.  
d. Economists’ designs, data, records, and notes referring exclusively to an employer’s work are 
the employer’s property. The employer should indemnify the economist for use of the 
information for any purpose other than the original purpose.  
e. Economists shall continue their professional development throughout their careers and should 
keep current in their specialty fields by engaging in professional practice, participating in 
continuing education courses, reading in the technical literature, and attending professional 
meetings and seminars.  
Discussion 
  In adapting the code, I specifically only changed only the terms “engineer” and 
“economist”, and made no other changes. What was amazing to me is how little I saw that 
seemed inappropriate to me. In fact there was only one statement in the entire code that I found 
objectionable, and that was Statement 7-a.
2This is in stark contrast to other codes of ethics that I 
                                                   
2 The statement is “Economists in private practice shall not review the work of another engineer for the same client, 
except with the knowledge of such engineer, or unless the connection of such engineer with the work has been 
terminated.” That statement provided more protection than I would believe is appropriate. But I see this as 11 
explored for other groups such as lawyers or for sub groups of economists who have developed 
explicit codes. I even have more differences with George DeMartino’s short “Economist’s Oath” 
than I do with this engineer’s code of ethics. For example, I would question DeMartino’s 
paragraph in his Oath about “exposing oppression” and “giving voice to the needs and 
aspirations of the dispossessed”, and his statement in favor of pluralism. It is not that I 
necessarily disagree with ethical sentiments behind these statements, but I have serious problem 
with their ambiguity and the way in which they may be interpreted. What if one believes that 
other’s theoretical perspective is wrong? Then I would believe that one has a responsibility to 
point that out, and not be pluralistic. Similarly, how are we to say what “oppression” is, or what a 
“self-serving” argument of the privileged” is. In my view, any code of ethics should avoid such 
areas of ambiguous interpretation as much as possible. What was amazing to me is how well the 
engineer’s code of ethics comported with my implicit code. This consistency of code exists even 
though the engineering profession operates quite differently than the economics profession in 
that engineering is generally private, and economics academic or public. But the sentiments 
conveyed were consistent with the methodology I see appropriately for economists.  
  Let me now turn to the question: Would adopting a variation of an engineering code of 
ethics make a difference? In practice, I suspect not, simply because I don’t see codes of ethics as 
significantly affecting behavior. But were economists to accept that they were engineers, not 
scientists, and change their methodology and presentation of research results accordingly, it 
would make a major difference. To demonstrate the differences it would make, below I suggest 
some places where I believe economists would be required to change what they do to meet this 
ethical code.  
  Rule II 1a (If economists’ judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life 
or property, they shall notify their employer or client and such other authority as may be 
appropriate.) should have led the economists developing financial derivative models to 
warn the public. (It was this ethical failing that we highlighted in Colander et al. 2009)  
  Rule II 2a. (Economists shall undertake assignments only when qualified by education or 
experience in the specific technical fields involved.) should have stopped many 
economists from making pronouncements about policy as economists, rather than making 
pronouncements as private individuals, which they are free to do. 
  Rule II 2b. (Economists shall not affix their signatures to any plans or documents dealing 
with subject matter in which they lack competence, nor to any plan or document not 
prepared under their direction and control.) should stop economists from advocating 
policy solutions outside of their specific area of expertise.  
  Rule II 3a (Economists shall be objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, 
or testimony. They shall include all relevant and pertinent information in such reports, 
statements, or testimony, which should bear the date indicating when it was current.) 
should lead economists to emphasize a bit more than they do how much economic theory 
changes over time, and does not reflect scientific truth, but rather engineering truth.  
  Rule II 3c. (Economists shall issue no statements, criticisms, or arguments on technical 
matters that are inspired or paid for by interested parties, unless they have prefaced their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
inappropriate for both economists and engineering. There should, in my view, be a general presumption that others 
will review and criticize one's work and no requirement that the person be informed that that is happening. 12 
comments by explicitly identifying the interested parties on whose behalf they are 
speaking, and by revealing the existence of any interest the economists may have in the 
matters.) would catch the funding issues that Inside Job highlighted. 
  Rule II 4a. (Economists shall disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest that 
could influence or appear to influence their judgment or the quality of their services.) 
goes beyond Rule 3c and places a restriction on broader conflicts of interests that often 
are more important than financial ones.  
  Rule III 1b. (Economists shall advise their clients or employers when they believe a 
project will not be successful.) is another important rule that would affect many economic 
consulting jobs, where it seems all too often economists come up with conclusions that fit 
the client wants to hear—conclusions that are sometimes referred to as “stadium project” 
conclusions because in studies these projects tend to have much bigger positive impacts 
than they have in practice.  
  Rule III 6 (Economists shall not attempt to obtain employment or advancement or 
professional engagements by untruthfully criticizing other economists, or by other 
improper or questionable methods.) would call into question some of the comments by 
some economists about other economist’s proposals.  
  I could go on, but these examples should make my point. Adoption a variation of the 
Engineer’s Code of Ethics would have a much broader reach than would DiMartino’s 
Economist’s Oath, or would a code trying to deal with the ethical problems highlighted by Inside 
Job. Perhaps the aspect I find most appealing about the engineering code of ethics is that it 
expresses a humility about one’s goals. It makes no sweeping claims about goals, but rather 
focuses on economic engineer’s individual actions. In my view such an individual action 
oriented code creates a professional ethic that is stronger than a more inclusive than a code that 
deals with moral judgments such as “opposing oppression” and “giving voice to the needs and 
aspirations of the dispossessed” By being limited about the nature of the code, we can be more 
humble. In a well known passage Keynes wrote that “If economists could manage to get 
themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be 
splendid.” I never quite understood Keynes’ dentist allusion, but I would suggest if we could 
replace “dentist” in the quotattion with “engineer”, that would indeed be splendid.  
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